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Conflicting Thoughts: The Effect
of Information on Support for an
Increase in the Federal Minimum
Wage Level
by Joshua Cooper and Alejandra Gimenez

In March 2014, President Obama urged Congress to approve a minimum wage
hike from $7.25 to $10.10. As expected, a debate sparked from both sides of the aisle
about whether it should be increased at all and if the proposed jump was too large.
Following this debate, a flurry of public opinion polls entered the field to measure
how Americans felt on this issue. Research firms from the Washington Post to Pew
fielded basic surveys asking how Americans felt about the potential wage hike. However, none of them looked at how the levels of information about the minimum wage
increase affected survey responses. We fill this hole by conducting a field experiment
through the Utah Colleges Exit Poll that varies the information given to the respondent. We presented respondents with either positive information, negative information, or both categories of information. In our study, we found respondents are
significantly affected by “negative” and “combined” sets of information.

Discussion of the Literature

The Strength of “Bad”
When presented with positive and negative information, people are affected
much more by the negative than the positive (Baumeister et al.). Further, negative or
“bad” information is processed more thoroughly and deeply than positive or “good”
information. The authors also look at the effects of good and bad events. Unsurprisingly, they find that bad events wear off slower than good events (326). When put into
a financial context, they find that losing money caused greater distress than winning
the same amount of money. Put differently, people are “more upset about losing $50
than [they] are happy about gaining $50” (326). Likewise, we expect similar results,
given that we are testing our theories on a monetary topic.
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Information as a Game Changer
In this experiment, we isolate the effects of information on respondent opinion.
James N. Druckman (2004) employed a similar technique using positive and negative information to study the shifting response rates when positive versus negative
information is presented. In his work, he tests both equivalency-framing effects and
issue-framing effects; equivalency framing presents the same information in different
lights, such as job loss versus job gain for the same event, while issue framing offers
two contrasting ideas, such as free speech versus public safety. Our experiment will
employ equivalency-framing effects by using positive and negative information
that are logically equivalent.
Martin Gilens (2001) conducted further research on the effects of different
kinds of information on political opinions. He finds that policy-based facts have an
important effect on political judgments, particularly in individuals with the highest
levels of general political knowledge. Gilens shows that citizens with low levels of
general political knowledge are less affected by policy-specific, relevant facts. He
theorizes that more political knowledge allows a voter to take new political facts
and evaluate them in context. Gilens also suggests that his research does not contradict research about cues that allow voters to vote according to those preferences, but
he says it shows that, at least for more politically knowledgeable members of the
public, the effect of raw facts is substantial. The minimum wage policy we are testing is far more relevant to the average person than the policies Gilens used (such as
foreign aid), and we hypothesize that our information will affect voters more since
the threshold of political knowledge about minimum wage is likely to be lower.
Matthew S. Levendusky (2011) argues that information has a relatively low but
real effect on differences in voters’ opinions and behavior. He uses matching algorithms in an attempt to control for other variables and to make his study as if the level
of information were randomly assigned. He then uses panel data to eliminate other
variables, which may lead to omitted variable bias. Levendusky contends that his
methods show that most research on the effect of information and politics has grossly
overestimated the effect of political information when controlling for other factors
in the correct way. Our research relates to his, because we assigned information
(although a small amount) randomly among voters and noted its implications. While
we recognized providing information may not have drastic effects, we believed we
would still see some sort of outcome when respondents receive information.
The Expected Effect of Partisan Leanings
Beyond information itself, partisanship also plays a large role in respondent selection. As may be expected, conservatives and liberals react differently to social and economic policies. In the literature, scholars find that conservative voters support policies
and leaders who create legislation that reduces tax rates (Swank and Swank 1993). In a
different light, voters also reward conservative leaders when tax rates are cut, regardless of the party of the person responsible (Lowry et al. 1998).
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James (2011) uses field and laboratory experiments to assess the effects of cues
about good and bad performance for local government officials. He finds the cues raise
or lower a citizen’s perception of performance and satisfaction with government officials
in the expected manner based on whether it is a good cue or a bad cue. Likewise, here we
are giving the voter a good cue, a bad cue, or both cues, and we expect to see positive,
negative, and mixed shifts because of these cues.
Many respondents will face a moral dilemma of sorts when we give them both
positive and negative information about raising the minimum wage. Brishen Rogers ascertains that minimum-wage laws create a level of social equality, an idea
internally accepted by most people (2014). Respondents may strongly oppose
raising the minimum wage on principle, but they do not want to seem unfair and
opposed to social justice by opposing a raise in the minimum-wage level. This
research suggests a person’s moral compass may override their personal political
beliefs in order to benefit society. From this, we gather that people will respond differently in such a way that they try to help society in whatever way that may be for
each set treatment.

The Setting of the Experiment: The Utah Colleges Exit Poll

To test our ideas, we conducted a survey experiment on the 2014 Utah Colleges
Exit Poll. The poll is a survey given to randomly selected voters as they leave their
voting station on Election Day. The questionnaire asked about their vote choice and
demographics, along with some issue-position questions. The sample is a stratified
random sample based on Utah’s four congressional districts. In 2014, early voting
was expected to be higher than ever, pronounced by the fact that both Cache and
Davis counties were using all or almost-all vote-by-mail systems. In order to create
an accurate sample that surveyed early voters who would not be at the polls on
Election Day, the Exit Poll sent postcards to a random subset of early voters and
invited them to take an online version of the poll. The Exit Poll also operated a
phone bank the week before the election to get responses from randomly selected
early voters who had not yet completed the online version of the survey. In total,
22,118 people responded to the Exit Poll in some form.
In order to fit as many questions as possible into the medium of the Exit Poll
survey, the questionnaire was broken down further. There were three colored forms
(blue, green, and yellow), each with a different set of questions. Respondents were
randomly given one of the three colors, so any variation among respondents is arbitrary. Our experiment was fielded on the yellow form, with each treatment swapped
out evenly and randomly among the yellow forms.
We used a 2x2 experimental design in which respondents were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions. As the base of each question stem, all respondents
were told what the current minimum wage was. The information that followed
then varied according to each condition. For the complete text of the questions, see
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Appendix A. We had 4,178 respondents, which gave us about one thousand respondents in each condition.
• Control: Did not provide any additional information. The control simply
asked the respondent whether or not they support a raise in the minimum
wage level.
• Positive Treatment (T1): Indicated that the minimum wage raise would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans.
• Negative Treatment (T2): Indicated that the minimum wage raise would eliminate 500,000 jobs.
• Combined Treatment (T3): Included both the positive and negative information.
We expected that, relative to the control, respondents given the positive treatment
would be more likely to support the increase in minimum wage, and respondents given
the negative treatment would be more likely oppose the increased minimum wage. For
those given the combined treatment with both the positive and negative information,
we expected the majority to still support the wage raise, because the respondents were
told it would help people and inherently be for the greater good (Rogers 2014). We also
expected more respondents would select the “do not know” option, since they were
being asked to choose between what is considered a “good” and “bad” thing.
In each of these situations, we expected social desirability to play a large role. While
the respondents’ answers to the questionnaires and the respondents themselves are
never connected to each other, the respondents still feel as though they should or should
not put a certain answer simply because that is what is expected of them (Rogers 2014).
In the positive treatment, people would feel inclined to favor the measure, because they
would not want to appear as if they do not want people to earn more money. In the negative treatment, we expected people to be swayed by the “bad” aspects of taking away
jobs and show less support (Baumeister et al.). In combined treatment, we expected
respondents to be caught between both of these competing theories. At this point, they
would opt for the “do not know” option at a higher rate than the previous two treatments, so they would not have to make a choice either way.

Modeling the Effect of the Information on Support for the Wage Increase

In order to analyze the results of our experiment, we used both a simple linear model and a multinomial probit model. We used the linear model for the initial
results discussion, and the multinomial probit for latter results and predictions.
To begin our analysis, we ran a basic OLS regression to look at the simple effects
of each treatment (see Figure 1). We did not include controls due to the experimental
nature of the study, since the randomization should control for variation among the
treatment groups. We found that the negative treatment had the strongest effect in
relation to the control; on average, the negative treatment is expected to decrease support by 16 percent. The combined treatment also strongly decreased support, though
not as strongly at 12 percent.
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Overall, the effect of our treatments on voters was not the same as what we
expected in our hypothesis. While we expected the positive treatment to significantly
increase the rate at which people would likely support the wage raise, it did not
have a statistically significant difference from the control. We attribute this to the fact
that the majority of our respondents are Republicans. Republicans tend to be fiscally
conservative, and we would not expect them to be persuaded to increase the minimum wage as easily as Democrats. Even though there may be a shift among the nonRepublicans, it may not be enough to be a significant factor in the positive treatment.
As the linear model shows, the negative and combined treatments both had significant effects. This model only accounts for whether or not someone supported or
Figure 1: Percentage of Favor Minimum Wage Increase by Treatment

Figure 2: Do you favor or oppose an increase in federal minimum wage?

89

SIGMA
opposed the wage raise. To solve this hole in our analysis, we turned to a multinomial probit. The multinomial probit accounts for respondents that indicated “support,” “oppose,” and “do not know.” As previously mentioned, we expected that the
amount of respondents who cho ose “do not know” would vary based on the treatment. We also expected that respondents who select “do not know” would be systematically different than those who express either support or opposition. As such,
we used a multinomial probit to analyze the effects of the “do not know” option (see
Figure 2).
The negative treatment shows a complete shift in preference when compared to
the control. Support for an increase in the minimum wage was 18 percentage points
lower than the control group. The effect was in line with our hypothesis. This is evidence of the weight of negative information and, particularly, of the type of information we had given. It appears that job loss is an unacceptable thing for many voters.
This also follows with the findings of Roy F. Baumeister et al. Although the number of
those who answered “do not know” rose between the negative treatment and the control, it is not enough to account for all voters, suggesting that many voters who would
have voted to support the minimum-wage raise opposed it specifically because of the
new information we presented.
We expected the combined treatment to trigger more responses of “do not
know”; however, we see results rather comparable to those of the negative treatment. It appears the effect of losing 500,000 jobs is greater than increasing 16.5 million Americans’ income. Negative information seemed to substantially outweigh the
positive information, despite the fact that the positive condition affected more people,
because 16.5 million people would have a higher income compared to the 500,000
people who would be out of a job. This finding is consistent with those of Baumeister
et al. in that the “bad” outweighs the “good.”
Additionally, the unweighted results and the predicted probabilities, both with
and without controls, are strikingly similar. The predicted probabilities from our multinomial regressions are almost an exact mirror of the percentages in the actual data.
The fact that the unweighted results mirror the controlled results demonstrates the
accuracy of randomizing treatments and encourages us to be confident in the validity
of our models and their implications.
Party ID was the most significant factor in our models when included. More
than any other variable, party affiliation predicts the largest percentage of change
for support among respondents. In both the linear and multinomial probit models,
party affiliation was heavily significant, often at the 0.01 level (see Appendix B for
full results).
What we can see in the data is that party follows roughly the same patterns we
might expect; democrats favor wage increase the most, followed by Independents,
and then Republicans. On the other hand, in the negative treatment, the model fails
to accurately predict what happened when Republicans received that treatment
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Table 1: Unweighted results compared to predicted probabilities
The Effect of Party Identification

Unweighted Results

Control

Positive

Negative

Both

Favor

53%

50%

36%

40%

Oppose

38%

41%

50%

48%

Do not know

9%

10%

14%

11%

Predicted Probabilities without Controls

Control

Positive

Negative

Both

Favor

53%

50%

36%

40%

Oppose

38%

41%

50%

48%

Do not know

9%

10%

14%

11%

Predicted Probabilities with Controls

Control

Positive

Negative

Both

Favor

54%

50%

36%

41%

Oppose

38%

40%

50%

48%

Do not know

8%

10%

14%

11%

(see Appendix C for comparison to unweighted results). This failure is because
the multinomial probit has the limitation of not allowing interactive control variables. Fortunately, this does not affect the overall validity of the model in conveying how the treatments affect respondents as we saw in our analysis of the initial
results. Nonetheless, it is interesting to examine the fact that the negative treatment
only caused a minor drop in Democrats’ support in the unweighted data, whereas
it caused a major drop in support among Independents and Republicans. It seems
that when given information about the positive and negative effects of a raise in
the minimum wage, Republicans and Independents do not find the trade-off to be
acceptable and respond with even more opposition than the control group, whereas
Democrats seem to find the trade-off acceptable.

The Effect of Age

Our predictions show age is a substantial factor in support for minimum wage,
with a U-shaped effect following age. People younger than twenty years old are likely
to support a minimum wage increase, but those who are between twenty and fiftynine are less likely to support it by around 4 percent. People who are over sixty are
even more likely to support minimum wage than those who are under twenty. This
suggests that those who are retired have a different view on wages than those who are
in the workforce, as this is most likely to account for these differences. We believe this
increase in wages is because those who are retired are most likely receiving benefits
from government programs (such as social security) and are more likely to favor social
welfare programs, even if those programs do not benefit them directly (one would not
expect minimum wage increases to benefit those over sixty). Also, since older people
are most likely retired, they probably pay fewer taxes and are not as concerned with
the possible increase in taxes that might come because of a minimum-wage increase.
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Figure 3: Predicted Minimum Wage Increase Support by Party ID

Note: It is important to note that in our main predictive model we have used a seven point
scale for party ID, but for simplicity in the graphs we have a used a three point model here to
examine the data and generate the predictions. Independent leaners were categorized according to their partisan leaning. To see the full breakdown, refer to Appendix C.

Figure 4: Predicted Minimum Wage Increase Suppory by Age

Note: In the model, age is a continuous variable, but we collapsed the age categories as shown
above to make for a simpler presentation.

The Effect of Income

The trend for income is as expected, with higher-income voters opposing minimum-wage increases and lower-income voters supporting the minimum-wage
increase (Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013). Generally, we observe that the effect
of each treatment is the same for the different groups. A sharp drop still occurs for
the negative treatment, because the effect of negative information is substantial, and
it continues in the combined treatment, although the drop is not as great, which is
attributed to their receiving positive information.
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Figure 5: Predicted Minimum Wage Support by Income

The Effect of Gender

As with many other political studies, the gender of the respondent influenced the
results. Females are much more likely to support the increase, regardless of treatment.
In fact, an average of a five-point difference tends to separate males and females in
each condition. The negative treatment flips the female-support effect, with neither
a male nor female plurality expected to support it. Instead, we see females are also
likely to oppose the wage increase, though at a lower level than males. Females
oppose this measure 44% to 38%, a 6% point gap, while males oppose the measure
55% to 34%, an 11% gap. This gap is because 6% more females than males chose the
“do not know” option.
The importance of the “do not know” option is especially prominent when the
responses are broken down by gender. Females select “do not know” nearly twice
as often as males. This finding is congruent with the literature, most of which states
that when respondents are unsure of an answer, males are more likely to mask their
uncertainty and randomly pick an option, while females are more likely to show
their uncertainty and pick the “do not know” option. Especially given that economics
and finances are considered more of a “man’s game” in politics, it is not surprising
that more females opted for “do not know” (Lawless 2004; Meeks 2010; Dolan 2014).
In the negative treatment, part of the reason we see closer “favor” and “oppose” rates
among females than males is because a larger proportion of the female respondents
selected “do not know.” Because of this, a smaller group of women remain to choose
favor or oppose, resulting in the closer gap.
Interestingly, both men and women are affected almost equally by the negative
treatment and the combined treatment regarding the “do not knows,” and the per93
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Figure 6: Minimum Wage Increase Support by Employment Status

centage of respondents choosing neither “favor” nor “oppose” increases in both men
and women. From this, we can gather that the negative treatment places an inquisitive burden on both genders at about the same rates and that the higher “do not
know” rate among females in response to the negative treatment is more of a function
of female uncertainty consistent with the literature rather than a specific burden from
the question itself.

The Effect of Religious Activity

In addition to other demographics, we decided to see how religious activity
affects support for increasing the federal minimum wage. In the state of Utah, where
the survey was fielded, approximately 65 percent of voters in 2014 identified with The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS)—otherwise known as the Mormon Church. Given the prominence of the Church in Utah, we generated a religion
index for members of the LDS faith. This index combines peoples’ religious identification and their religious activity. The scale spans from “Active LDS” to “Non-LDS”
(see the graph below for the full scale breakdown).
As it turns out, there is a strong correlation between activity in the Church and
support for the minimum-wage laws. A possible reason for this could be that when
one becomes more active in the LDS religion, one becomes much more likely to
oppose new laws. The opposite is true as well, in that less active and non-members
of the LDS Church in Utah usually support creating new laws. One of the most striking findings is that the level of support in relation to the other points on the religious
index does not change. Rather, support is either suppressed or increased among all
groups per each treatment, while the slope from “Active LDS” to “Non-LDS” remains
virtually the same. Overall, support for the wage increase was significantly hampered
with the negative treatment, including among Non-LDS respondents, whose support
and opposition we expected to be about the same regardless of treatment.
While in other demographic categories “do not know” responses are important
in the analysis, they do not play such an important role in religion. For the most
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Figure 7: Minimum Wage Increase Support by Religion Index

part, “Active LDS” and “Non-LDS” alike selected “do not know” at similar rates.
As with the overall treatment effects, the respondents who selected “do not know”
increase with the negative treatment and go back down slightly on the combined
treatment, though the effects are not statistically significant. Because a large majority of LDS members are conservative and identify with the Republican Party, active
LDS members and conservatives often mirror each other’s response rate, since they
tend to be the same group. When we look at the effect of party identification, we see
that, excluding Independents, Democrats and Republicans selected “do not know”
in a pattern similar to the patterns of the religious index. “Do not know” increases
on the negative treatment and drops slightly on the combined treatment. While
their “do not know” percentages are fairly similar, they differ slightly. Non-LDS
respondents tend to report “do not know” at a slightly lower rate, and such is the
case with Democrats. As such, we can draw a parallel between party identification
and the religion index.

The Effect of Employment Status

In our research, we found that employment status does not affect support
for an increase in the federal minimum wage. Though not significant, we chose
to explore this variable, since its lack of results ignites some interesting thought.
The Utah Colleges Exit Poll asks respondents what their employment status is,
and respondents are asked to choose from a list of seven options, including selfemployed, employed, unemployed, homemaker, and retired. For the purposes of
analyzing this data, we have chosen to collapse self-employed and employed into
the “employed” category and to collapse unemployed, retired, and homemaker1
into the “unemployed” category.
When we compared the response rate for both the employed and unemployed,
we found there is no significant difference in their response choice per condition;
they actually respond with virtually the same choices through all conditions. We see
that the negative treatment has the largest effect and significantly lowers support.
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Firgure 8: Minimum Wage Increase Support by Employment Status

While in the control and first treatment the majorities of both the employed and
unemployed supported the increase, support drops by more than 10 percent among
those same groups in the negative and combined treatments, with the largest effect
occurring in the negative treatment. The “do not know” rates are also very similar,
further showing that employment status does not matter. Regardless of employment status, these numbers once again show the strong effect of the negative treatment
and slightly less strong effect of the combined treatment.

Conclusion

Overall, the negative treatment places a significant toll on all respondents,
regardless of gender, income, or other demographic variables. The combined treatment also lowers support rates more than the control and first treatment. As demonstrated in the significant drop in favor in the negative treatment, maintaining jobs is
important to many Utahans. Although people are told that others will have a greater
income, they are still influenced by the job loss that would take place, even though
the percent affected by the job loss is fractional compared to those for whom income
would increase.
One large limitation is our question presentation. In the combined treatment, we
could not randomize the order of the treatment information. Due to logistical limitations, the positive treatment was always listed before the negative treatment. While
both pieces of information were included, we recognize the possibility that we are
seeing the effects of recency bias (Ornstein 2013). In other words, the respondent’s
mind sticks with the last piece of information they were given, which in this case is
the negative information. We thought we might see more support on the combined
treatment because of the inclusion of the positive information, but we see in the combined treatment a plurality still opposes the wage raise. However, we do not see a
significant effect in the positive treatment, indicating the positive treatment itself was
not strong enough. This leads us to believe this limitation does not inhibit our results.
The control question mirrors a question from a CNN/ORC poll conducted from
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late May into June 2014. In the data, we see a noticeable difference between their
reported responses and our reported responses. In the CNN poll, we see 18 percent more
support for increasing the federal minimum wage. There is only a 9 percent difference
between levels of opposition, though. We attribute this difference to the drastically
different “do not know” responses: 1 percent in the CNN/ORC poll, but 9 percent in
the UCEP poll. While these differences may seem alarming, we must remember that
Utah is a highly conservative state, and the CNN poll was a national sample that has
many more Democrats and Independents than Utah.2
Figure 9: Control

"As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. Do you
favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?"

Note: Percentages for UCEP 2014 represent the weighted survey data, not predicted values, in
order to create a fairer comparison to the poll. CNN/ORC Poll: n=1,003; UCEP 2014: n=1,066.

The base of the information for the treatments comes from a Bloomberg National
Poll run in March 2014.3 The trend of decreased favor and increased opposition continues in the Bloomberg poll, just as it does in ours, suggesting that the weight of
losing 500,000 jobs is greater than the weight of raising the incomes of 16.5 million
Americans. The Bloomberg poll asks whether the tradeoff is acceptable or unacceptable, and the response options are “acceptable,” “unacceptable,” and “unsure.” While
not an exact comparison, it provides a general idea of Utah compared to the rest of
the nation. We would hypothesize that the wording of the question as acceptable or
unacceptable increases the amount of opposition further than our question does, as
a person could say it is unacceptable but still support a raise in the minimum wage.
The importance of maintaining jobs is an important theme across the nation, not
just in Utah. As such, we expect these results would be similar if this experiment were
run in other states. Since Utah is a very conservative state, we believe the starting support level would be lower than that of a more liberal state. However, we feel the effect
of the negative information in the negative and combined treatments would be just as
strong in other states. As such, we would get the same statistical effect per treatment but
with different numbers. Baumeister et al., show that bad impressions “are quicker to
form and more resistant” to change than good impressions, and we expect the bad information of job loss would be just as relevant and have as much impact in other states.
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Figure 10: Combined Treatment Effects: Bloomberg vs. UCEP

Note: Percentages for UCEP 2014 represent the weighted survey date, not predicted values,

in order to create a more fair comparison to the poll. Bloomberg National Poll: n=1,001; UCEP
2014. n=1,066.

The Baumeister et al., piece adds a plea at the end for researchers to find places in
which the bad does not outweigh the good. Unfortunately, we would have to report to
Baumeister and his fellow researchers that we have also found that the bad outweighs
the good. Our results show that preventing job loss is important to Utahans. Without
knowing the trade-offs of the minimum wage increase, the public is willing to support
it; as soon as jobs are on the line, however, support is dramatically cut.
NOTES
1. We tested collapsing the employment variable with homemakers being considered both employed and unemployed. There was no significant difference whether the homemakers were
considered employed or unemployed.
2. In the 2014 Utah Colleges Exit Poll, the partisan breakdown was as follows: 28% Democrat,
62% Republican, and 10% Independent. In the CNN poll, the partisan breakdown was as follows: 30% Democrat, 23% Republican, and 47%Independents.
3. Bloomberg poll question stem: “A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office says that
raising the minimum wage to $10.10 over the next three years would increase the incomes of
16.5 million Americans while eliminating 500,000 jobs. Does that tradeoff seem acceptable or
unacceptable to you?” Response options: acceptable, unacceptable, and unsure.
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APPENDIX A: Original Question Text
Control:
As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. Knowing
this, do you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?
Treatment 1 (positive):
As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. A recent
report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to $10.10 over
the next three years would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans. Knowing this, do
you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?
Treatment 2 (negative):
As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. A recent
report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to $10.10 over
the next three years would eliminate five hundred thousand jobs. Knowing this, do you favor or
oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?
Treatment 3 (positive and negative):
As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to $10.10 over the
next three years would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans, and eliminate five hundred
thousand jobs. Knowing this, do you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?
Response Options
a. Favor
b. Oppose
c. Unsure
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APPENDIX B: Statistical Models
Table 1: Linear Regression
Dependent Variable: Support for Minimum Wage (1=favor, 0=oppose)
(1)

(2)

-0.0303

-0.0329

(0.0226)

(0.0219)

-0.163***

-0.156***

(0.0230)

(0.0215)

-0.127***

-0.118***

(0.0229)

(0.0219)

VARIABLES
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Gender

-0.0821***
(0.0159)

Age

0.00135***
(0.000507)

Not-so-strong Democrat

-0.0865**
(0.0389)

Independent leaning Democrat

-0.0193
(0.0190)

Independent

-0.320***
(0.0336)

Independent leaning Republican

-0.569***
(0.0269)

Not-so-strong Republican

-0.487***
(0.0326)

Strong Republican

-0.584***
(0.0251)

Other

-0.559***
(0.0373)

Do not know

-0.346***
(0.0830)

High school graduate

0.186*
(0.105)

Some college

0.108
(0.102)

College graduate

0.0815
(0.102)
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Post-graduate

0.108
(0.103)

Somewhat active LDS

0.0668*
(0.0374)

Less active LDS

0.0744*
(0.0392)

Non-LDS

0.117***
(0.0209)

Employed

-0.0141
(0.0178)

Income

-0.00981**
(0.00384)

Constant

0.581***

0.839***

(0.0159)

(0.108)

Observations

3,717

2,918

R-squared

0.018

0.339

Adjusted R-squared

0.016

0.334

Note: Dependent variable is Support for a Raise in Minimum Wage where 1 is support and 0 is oppose. Heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. A * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent
level. A ** indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. A *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.

Table 2: Multinomial Probit
Dependent Variable: Support for Minimum Wage (1=favor, 0=oppose, 2= Do not know)
(0) Oppose
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Gender
Age
Not-so-strong Democrat
Independent leaning Democrat
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(1) Favor

(2) Do not know

-0.137

0.0460

(0.102)

(0.128)

-0.770***

0.0345

(0.104)

(0.123)

-0.573***

-0.0302

(0.102)

(0.125)

-0.411***

-0.598***

(0.0759)

(0.0900)

0.00568**

-0.00122

(0.00243)

(0.00281)

-0.896***

-0.441

(0.264)

(0.320)

-0.413**

-0.0343

(0.204)

(0.252)

SIGMA
Independent
Independent leaning Republican
Not-so-strong Republican
Strong Republican
Other
Do not know
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Post-graduate
Somewhat active LDS
Less active LDS
Non-LDS
Employed
Income
Constant
Observations

3,268

-1.883***

-0.718***

(0.198)

(0.244)

-2.794***

-1.424***

(0.189)

(0.232)

-2.461***

-1.116***

(0.197)

(0.242)

-2.866***

-1.375***

(0.186)

(0.227)

-2.789***

-1.635***

(0.216)

(0.279)

-2.054***

-0.480

(0.343)

(0.409)

0.788*

-0.533

(0.471)

(0.454)

0.422

-0.549

(0.459)

(0.433)

0.301

-0.700

(0.458)

(0.433)

0.425

-0.801*

(0.463)

(0.441)

0.230

0.00421

(0.154)

(0.183)

0.333*

0.223

(0.184)

(0.218)

0.548***

0.187*

(0.0912)

(0.111)

-0.0814

-0.0815

(0.0843)

(0.0955)

-0.0459**

-0.0326

(0.0180)

(0.0215)

2.054***

1.188**

(0.516)

(0.508)

3,268

3,268

Note: Dependent variable is Support for a Raise in Minimum Wage where 0 is oppose, 1 is support and 2 is do not know. Column
1 is used as the base case and all coefficients are generated using column one as the base. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. A * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level. A **
indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. A *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
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APPENDIX C: Party Identification Graphs
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